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Robert Audi in several of his papers; cf., e.g., "Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and 
Defeasibility," Synthese, 55 (1983), 119-39, esp. pp. 128-30. This and other issues raised in my 
critical comments are also illuminated in William P. Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism," The 
Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII, 7 (April 8, 1976), 165-85. 
4. Cf. Alston's article cited in the previous note. 
Is God a Creationist?, ed. by Roland M. Frye. New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons. $15.95, paper $9.95. 
Reviewed by FREDERICK J. CROSSON, University of Notre Dame. 
Despite the rather odd title, this is a useful collection of eleven essays, drawn 
from diverse sources (conferences, magazines, books) and stitched together by 
an editorial prologue and epilogue. Six of the pieces address the creationist 
controversy directly, the others deal with the relations of science and religion 
or with scriptural exegesis (especially of Genesis 1-3). Five of the essays are by 
physical scientists and three by scripture scholars. 
The occasion for the book, as for its first six essays, is the appearance on the 
American scene of "creation science" or creationism. Vigorously pressed by its 
supporters-mostly through state legislature--creation science is presented as 
an alternative theory to evolution in accounting for the origin of living forms 
and of the fossil record. As an alternative theory, its supporters have sought to 
gain access for it to the way in which biology is taught, especially on the high 
school level. The most recent case involved an Arkansas law of 1981 which 
required that equal time be given to creation science wherever evolution was 
taught in the schools. In 1982 a Federal District Court found the law unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that, being specifically linked to the Bible, the mandated 
teaching represented an establishment of religion. 
In an attempt to deflect this interpretation of the law in advance, the defendants 
filed a "Findings of Fact" which included this extraordinary claim: 
Creation-science does presuppose the existence of a creator, to the same 
degree that evolution-science presupposes the existence of no creator. 
As used in the context of creation-science, as defined by 54(a) (sic) of 
Act 590, the terms or concepts of "creation" and "creator" are not 
inherently religious terms or concepts. In this sense, the term "creator" 
means only some entity with power, intelligence, and a sense of design_ 
Creation-science does not require a creator who has a personality, who 
has the attributes of love, compassion, justice, etc., which are ordinarily 
attributed to a diety. Indeed, the creation-science model does not require 
that the creator still be in existence. 
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(Hume's Philo would have been pleased.) 
Only one of the essays deals directly with this trial, a reflection by Langdon 
Gilkey on the arguments and underlying issues. Of the other pieces, the best are 
two by scientists and two by scripture scholars. Of the former, one is by Asa 
Gray, the 19th century Yale biologist, speaking to theological students on evolu-
tion (an unusual but successful inclusion), the other by Owen Gingerich of 
Harvard on creation and the big-bang theory. The scriptural studies are exegeses 
of the concept of creation as it appears in Genesis: one is by Nahum Sarna, the 
other by Bernhard Anderson. 
Two central issues emerge from the book. 
One is the literalism of Biblical interpretation which is the foundation of 
creation science and which is in tum "confirmed" by its interpretation of the 
empirical data. To take Genesis in this narrowly literal way is, e.g., to take 
creation of everything up to man to have occurred in six days, and to take the 
flood to have killed off many forms of life whose fossils remain in the strata. 
The second is implied by the first: on the literal reading of creation science, 
Genesis is giving the same kind of account that geology or paleontology gives 
of the strata, or that biology gives of the origin of species. The only difference, 
fundamentally, is that it presents itself as an alternative account. Two weighty 
consequences follow. 
On the one hand, biblical literalism of this sort strengthens the belief of many 
scientists that religion is simply primitive science which is disconfirmed and cast 
aside as scientific knowledge advances. (Not only is this belief strengthened, 
but the public raising of critical questions about anomalies in evolutionary theory 
tends to be discouraged.) On the other hand, creation science must respond to 
a large and growing amount of data which is not compatible with its tenets, e.g., 
on the age of the earth. Here is a creation science response: 
The biblical cosmologist finally must recognize that the geological ages 
can have had no true objective existence at all, if the Bible is true. 
(Henry Morris, Biblical Cosmology 
and Modern Science, p. 23) 
Neither of these two central issues requires the Christian to subscribe to the 
positions taken by creation science. With respect to the literalist reading of 
Genesis, neither the notion of "biblical inerancy," nor the Christian tradition of 
biblical interpretation (e.g., St. Augustine already construes the "days" of creation 
as figurative), nor the text itself require the narrowly literal reading. With respect 
to the accounts given by geology and evolution of the development of the earth 
and of species, they neither presuppose nor require-as creationists repeatedly 
insist they do-atheism. Physical science addresses and can address only the 
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question of proximate origin (how did A arise out of B?), not the question of 
ultimate origin of anything at all. The scholastic distinction of primary and 
secondary causality embodies the insight that God's creative action is effected 
through natural causes producing their own proper effects. No account of the 
world in terms of those natural causes (plate tectonics, gene pools, etc.) is 
inconsistent with God's providential employment of the same causes. 
Only miracles might be understood to involve a direct action of God , suspending 
ordinary causal connections. But nothing in the text of Genesis requires the 
reading of creation as a series of such extraordinary interventions. There is 
ground for thinking, nevertheless, that behind the intellectual "set" that gives 
rise to creationism is the impulse to see the hand of God in a more vivid and 
empirical way, to see God as more a part of the way of the world, than the 
revelation of his transcendent difference from creation allows. If this suspicion 
is correct, then creationism is paradoxically and ironically a retention of a more 
archaic religiousness within Judeo-Christian revelation. 
Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes 
Climacus, by C. Stephen Evans. Humanities Press, 1983.304 pp. $17.95. 
Reviewed by MEROLD WESTPHAL, Hope College. 
This volume is a companion to the two books from Kierkegaard's 
pseudonymous authorship which are attributed to Johannes Climacus. It is a 
companion rather than a commentary because it presents its close reading of 
these two texts (against the background of Kierkegaard's other writings) themat-
ically rather than consecutively. Still, it has the kind of completeness one looks 
for in a commentary. There is practically nothing in the Philosophical Fragments 
or the Concluding Unscientific Postscript which does not get discussed. 
As the subtitle indicates, Evans takes the pseudonymity of these texts seriously. 
Though he acknowledges the depth and breadth of agreement between Kier-
kegaard and Climacus and regularly documents it with citations from what Kier-
kegaard wrote under his own name, he does not treat pseudonymity as a merely 
literary or biographical matter. Instead, he points to the substantive significance 
of the device both in terms of the distancing it permits between author and reader 
in an area where Kierkegaard believes indirect communication to be essential 
and in terms of the particular identity of Climacus, who writes about Christianity 
from the perspective of a philosophically sophisticated unbeliever. 
The opening three chapters serve an introductory capacity. The first spells out 
the problems in reading and writing about the pseudonymous authorship in 
